Section 14(b) and Communication Workers v. Western Electric Co.: An End Run Around Preemption by Vehar, August Randall
Denver Law Review 
Volume 53 Issue 4 Article 6 
March 2021 
Section 14(b) and Communication Workers v. Western Electric 
Co.: An End Run Around Preemption 
August Randall Vehar 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
August Randall Vehar, Section 14(b) and Communication Workers v. Western Electric Co.: An End Run 
Around Preemption, 53 Denv. L.J. 731 (1976). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
COMMENT
SECTION 14(b) AND Communication Workers v.
Western Electric Co.: AN END RUN AROUND
PREEMPTION
INTRODUCTION
It is a widely accepted principle of federalism that Congress
has almost entirely preempted' the field of labor law. Preemption
developed rapidly in this area after Congress adopted the Taft-
Hartley Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act' in
1947. One of the most significant of these amendments is section
14(b) 3-a partial exception to the general rule of preemption-
which expressly permits individual states to enact legislation
prohibiting union-security agreements. 4 In those states which
I The preemption doctrine, based on the supremacy clause in art. VI, § 2 of the
United States Constitution, results in federal law superseding and displacing incompati-
ble state law. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959). For a series of articles examining the development of the preemption doctrine in
the labor field see Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HIAv. L. REV. 1297
(1954); Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA. L.
REv. 1057 (1958); Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1337 (1972);
Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLUM.
L. REv. 469 (1972).
2 49 Stat. 449, as amended by 61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519 and 88 Stat. 395, 29 U.S.C.
§ 141 et seq. (1970).
2 Section 14(b) provides:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution
or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execu-
tion or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.
29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970).
The term "union-security" describes a variety of arrangements,
usually contractual, whereby union membership [or the payment of the
equivalent of union dues] is made a condition of employment. The tradi-
tional types of clauses include: (1) the closed shop, which permits the hiring
only of members of the appropriate union [this type of clause is now illegal
in the United States]; (2) the full union shop, under which all employees
must join the union within a certain period, typically within 30 days of
hiring; (3) the modified union shop, which allows new members to withdraw
from membership at stated periods, or exempts old employees who are not
members; (4) maintenance of membership, which imposes no membership
requirement, but does require employees who join the union to continue their
membership; and (5) the agency shop, which requires non-union employees
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have not prohibited such agreements, union-security contracts
are permitted by section 8(a)(3) of the federal act.'
The question was recently raised before the Colorado Su-
preme Court of whether this authority ceded to the states by
section 14(b) is limited to flatly prohibiting union-security agree-
ments or whether the section allows states to regulate such agree-
ments in other ways. In Communication Workers v. Western
Electric Co.,' the Colorado Supreme Court construed section
14(b) in conjunction with the Colorado Labor Peace Act (CLPA).7
The court held that the State of Colorado could regulate (as well
as forbid) union-security clauses by requiring a referendum in
which three-fourths of those employees voting must approve ne-
gotiation of such a security agreement before it is legal. More
significantly, the court upheld that portion of the Colorado stat-
ute which, in the process of regulating such agreements, affects
the procedure by which recognized bargaining units are deter-
mined: The statute specifies that, in order for members of a bar-
gaining unit to be eligible to vote in a union-security authoriza-
tion referendum, the bargaining unit itself must have been deter-
to pay to the union a sum equal to fees and dues paid by members.
Henderson, The Confrontation of Federal Preemption and State Right-to-Work Laws,
1967 DUKE L.J. 1079, 1082 n.13.
Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of
the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement
with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any
action defined in this subsection as an unfair labor practice) to require as a
condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day
following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such
agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organization is the repre-
sentative of the employees as provided in section 159(a) of this title, in the
appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when
made; and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in section 159(e)
of this title within one year preceding the effective date of such agreement,
the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees
eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority of such
labor organization to make such an agreement ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). The Colorado Supreme Court incorrectly stated in
Communication Workers that this section, which now in effect prohibits the closed shop,
"disclaimed a national policy hostile to the closed shop .... " 551 P.2d at 1078.
1 551 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1976), appeals dismissed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan. 25,
1977).
1 CoLD. REv. STAT. §§ 8-3-101 et seq. (1973). In Communication Workers, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court cited to the 1963 Colorado Revised Statutes. This comment, however,
will cite only to the 1973 codification. For a history of the CLPA see H. SELIGSON & G.
BADwm , LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN COLORADO 139-52 (1961).
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mined by means of an election.' The court's decision appears to
raise serious questions of federal-state conflict because the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, which has been granted sole au-
thority to determine units for general collective bargaining pur-
poses,' does not necessarily require or even always allow an elec-
tion to be held for determining the appropriate unit.
Following the decision by the Colorado Supreme Court,
Communication Workers was appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want
of a substantial federal question."0 This comment will discuss two
issues raised by Communication Workers which could have been
confronted by the Supreme Court on appeal:" (1) Is Colorado's
authority under section 14(b) limited to prohibiting union-
security clauses; or does it include the power to regulate such
clauses by requiring employees to authorize negotiation of the
clause by a three-quarters affirmative vote? (2) May Colorado
regulate the determination of appropriate units for general collec-
tive bargaining purposes; if not, does section 14(b) authorize Col-
orado to regulate unit determination for the specific purpose of
defining the group of employees who will vote in the union-
security authorization referenda?
I. Communication Workers v. Western Electric Co.
The provision of the Colorado Labor Peace Act requiring a
This unit election is to be conducted by the Colorado Division of Labor, COLO. REv.
STAT. § 8-3-107(2) (1973), though COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-3-104(10) (1973) provides that an
election conducted by "any tribunal having competent jurisdiction" will also be
recognized. Presumably the NLRB has competent jurisdiction within the meaning of the
section.
I La Crosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 18 (1949);
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
" This type of dismissal is a decision on the merits. The precedential weight of this
decision is not entirely clear, although a recent case appears to bind lower courts until
the Supreme Court indicates otherwise. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975).
Elsewhere, in an extensive dissent, Mr. Justice Brennan has pointed out the danger of
placing such weight on a summary disposition. Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v.
Rizzo, 96 S. Ct. 3228 (1976) (dissenting from the denial of a petition for a writ of certior-
ari).
' Other issues in Communication Workers which will not be discussed here include:
(1) the definition of an "all-union agreement," COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-3-104(1) (1973); (2)
whether the agreements in issue are "all-union agreements"; and (3) whether the referen-
dum and collective bargaining unit requirements were intended by the state legislature
to cover only those employers whose business affects intrastate commerce or also those
employers, such as the appellee-defendants, who are engaged in interstate commerce.
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referendum to authorize a union-security agreement has not been
widely followed since its adoption in 1943.12 Given traditional
management opposition to union-security agreements, it is sur-
prising that the first court challenge to agreements executed in
the absence of such a referendum did not come until recently.
There was no factual controversy in Communication
Workers. It was stipulated that the National Labor Relations
Board had recognized the Communication Workers as the exclu-
sive bargaining agent for the employees of the appellee-employers
in several states. Secret ballot elections to determine the appro-
priate bargaining units' 3 or their representatives 4 had not been
held by either the NLRB or the Colorado Division of Labor. In
addition, the union-security referenda required under the CLPA'
5
had not been conducted. Nevertheless, the employers voluntarily
entered into several collective bargaining agreements with the
Communication Workers. Each of these agreements contained
either a modified agency shop or a modified maintenance-of-
membership clause, 6 which required, as a condition of continued
employment, the payment of union dues. The agreements pro-
vided an escape period, however, during which current employees
could divest themselves of the obligation to pay dues. Those who
did not so act during the escape period were obligated to continue
paying dues; if they subsequently failed to pay dues, the union
2 See note 89 infra.
" Under the authority granted to the NLRB by 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970), the Board
has discretion to determine the appropriate unit by elections or other means. In
Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, Uranium Div., 162 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966), the Board set forth
the guidelines it would follow in determining whether or not to hold an election. See note
50 infra. For a discussion of unit determination post-Mallinckrodt see J. ABODEELY, THE
NLRB AND THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT 94-112 (1971); Cohen, Two Years Under
Mallinckrodt: A Review of the Board's Latest Craft Unit Policy, 20 LAB. L.J. 195 (1969).
For a discussion of pre.Mallinckrodt policy see Note, Labor Law-Determination of Ap-
propriate Bargaining Unit, 1960 Wis. L. REv. 683. See also Samoff, Law School Education
in NLRB Representation Cases, 21 LAB. L.J. 691 (1970).
" In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), the Court upheld the authority
of the NLRB to issue bargaining orders to an employer who had committed unfair labor
practices "which have made the holding of a fair election unlikely or which have in fact
undermined a union's majority and caused an election to be set aside." Id. at 610. Thus,
an employer may have to recognize the union as the representative of its employees even
without a representation election. See generally R. WILLIAMS, P. JAMES, & K. HUNN, NLRB
REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT (1974).
SCOLO. REV. STAT. § 8-3-108(c) (1973).
IS See note 4 supra.
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could, under the terms of the agreements, compel the employer
to discharge them. The dispute arose when the employers refused
to dismiss employees who ceased payment of their dues after the
escape period. The employers contended that the union-security
clauses 7 were invalid for lack of compliance with the CLPA.
The CLPA provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer to
[ejncourage or discourage membership in any labor organization
... by discrimination in regard to hiring, tenure, or other terms or
conditions of employment; except that an employer shall not be
prohibited from entering into an all-union agreement with the repre-
sentatives of his employees in a collective bargaining unit where
three-quarters or more of his employees have voted affirmatively by
secret ballot in favor of such all-union agreement in a referendum
conducted by the director [of the Colorado Division of Labor]."
'7 The term "all-union agreement," CoLO. Rxv. STAT. § 8-3-104(1) (1973), as it was
used in Communication Workers, is synonymous with the better known term, "union-
security agreement." It should be noted, however, that the Communication Workers vigor-
ously argued that "all-union agreements" as defined by the CLPA were limited to closed
shop agreements, which were legal under federal law prior to the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments adopted in 1947, and that lesser agreements, such as an agency shop, were not
included in this definition and thus were not subject to the referendum requirement. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court, in International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Bd., 245 Wis. 417, 429, 14 N.W.2d 872, 878-79 (1944), construed that state's referen-
dum requirements for all-union agreements, Wis. STAT. ch. 57, § 111.06(1)(c) (1939), as
amended Wis. STAT. § 111.06(1)(c)1 (Supp. 1.01 1976-77), in conjunction with 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1970) and held that "all-union agreements" applied only to those agreements
that required all employees in the bargaining unit to be members of the union. But see
Public Serv. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 418, 420-24 (1950). The definition of an "all-union agree-
ment" in Wisconsin at that time, Wis. STAT. ch. 57, § 111.02(9) (1939), as amended Wis.
STAT. § 111.02(9) (1974), referred to "all of the employes in such unit" as does the present
Colorado statute, COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-3-104(1) (1973). Prior to Communication Workers
the Colorado Division of Labor interpreted, as did the Wisconsin court, "all-union agree-
ments" as referring only to union-shop clauses. A maintenance-of-membership agreement,
for instance, does not require all employees to be members of the union. Therefore, refer-
enda were not required by the Division of Labor to authorize agency-shop or maintenance-
of-membership clauses. Interview with Robert Frey, Labor Mediator with the Colorado
Division of Labor, in Denver, Colorado (Oct. 22, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Second Frey
Interview]. Since most of the collective bargaining contracts in Colorado contain these
latter types of union-security agreements, id., rather than union-shop clauses, few refer-
enda were required by the Division.
"1 COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-3-108(c) (1973) (emphasis added). There has been no judicial
opinion in Colorado on whether this section requires a three-quarters vote of all employees
in the unit or whether it requires approval of only three-quarters of those voting. The
Colorado Attorney General has issued an opinion stating that only a three-quarter major-
ity among those actually voting is required. [1949-501 CoLO. ATroRNEY GEN. BIENNIAL
Rwowr 94.
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In upholding the employers' refusal to discharge non-paying em-
ployees, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
ruling 9 that (1) the statute applies to employers engaged in inter-
state as well as intrastate commerce; (2) the union-security
clauses in question fall within the Colorado definition of all-union
agreements;"0 and (3) section 14(b) permits states to regulate2' (as
well as forbid) union-security clauses by requiring an authoriza-
tion referendum. The Colorado Supreme Court also held, how-
ever, that determination of the appropriate collective bargaining
unit 22 by secret ballot election is "a condition precedent to any
labor organization's right to enter into an all-union agreement
with an employer under Colorado law. '2 3 While the court recog-
nized that this unit, determined under Colorado law for the spe-
cific purpose of a union-security referendum, might be different
from the general purpose collective bargaining unit determined
by the NLRB, 24 it found Colorado's regulation of unit determina-
tion to be "merely an incident ' 5 of the authority ceded to the
state by section 14(b).
Unit determination for general collective bargaining pur-
poses has been preempted from the states.26 The Colorado Su-
preme Court, however, has carved out an exception to this policy,
" Communication Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 88 L.R.R.M. 3481 (Dist. Ct. Denver
1974), aff'd, 551 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1976), appeals dismissed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan.
25, 1977).
2* Cow. REv. STAT. § 8-3-104(1) (1973). See note 17 supra.
21 Accord, Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
336 U.S. 301 (1949). See text accompanying notes 29-41 infra.
2 A collective bargaining unit in Colorado is defined as:
an organization selected by secret ballot, as provided in section 8-3-107, by
a majority vote of the employees of one employer employed within the state
who vote at an election for the selection of such unit, except that, where a
majority of such employees engaged in a single craft, division, department,
or plant have voted by secret ballot that the employees of such single craft,
division, department, or plant shall constitute their collective bargaining
unit, it shall be so considered. Two or more collective bargaining units may
bargain collectively through the same representative or where a majority of
the employees in each separate unit have voted to do so by secret ballot, as
provided in section 8-3-107.
Cow. REv. STAT. § 8-3-104(4) (1973).
551 P.2d at 1076.
2, Id. at 1079.
25 Id.
21 La Crosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 18 (1949);
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
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with the apparent approval of the United States Supreme
Court," by holding that the state has authority to determine the
appropriate unit for the specific purpose of union-security refer-
enda."
II. STATE REGULATION OF UNION-SECURITY CLAUSES
The Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of section
14(b) is supported, in part, both by a United States Supreme
Court decision, and by a reading of the legislative history sur-
rounding the adoption of the Taft-Hartley amendments. The text
of section 14(b) provides:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the
execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or
Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by
State or Territorial law.2'
In the absence of state legislation authorized by this section,
unions are free to negotiate union-security agreements once they
are recognized as exclusive bargaining agents. 9 Employers, of
course, are not required to agree to include such clauses in the
collective bargaining contract. In the so-called "right-to-work"
states, however, legislation has been enacted under section 14(b)
that prohibits union-security agreements, even if both employers
and unions wish to include such clauses in their collective bar-
gaining contracts. Colorado's statute as interpreted takes a mid-
dle position. The CLPA permits union-security agreements but
only after two elections: the first to determine the bargaining
unit; and the second, a referendum, in which three-quarters of the
voting employees of the unit to be covered by the union-security
" Communication Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan. 25,
1977). The Board also argued against allowing Colorado to determine bargaining units for
specific union-security purposes. Brief for NLRB as Amicus Curiae at 9-11, Communica-
tion Workers v. Western Elec. Co., supra. Portions of the NLRB's brief are quoted at note
55 infra.
2 551 P.2d at 1078, 1079. The Colorado Supreme Court specifically pointed out that
the unit determined by the state was only for the purpose of an all-union referendum. Id.
Nowhere in the CLPA, however, is there such a limitation of the purpoAes for which a state
unit is chosen.
2 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
1 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
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agreement must affirmatively approve the negotiation of such an
agreement.
3 '
The latter aspect of this two-step process, the referendum,
appears to be compatible with section 14(b): The CLPA is pat-
terned after the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act 2 which was
upheld by the Supreme Court in Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co.
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board.33 One of the primary
issues in Algoma was whether the NLRB's certification of a unit
representative "ousted" the state from regulating remedies for
violations of the state's union-security statute. In
Communication Workers the union argued 3 that the language in
Algoma3 5 upholding the right of a state to regulate under section
14(b) was vague. Specifically, it was urged that Algoma's holding
concerned only the state's right to enforce a remedy against an
employer who sought to give effect to a union-security clause that
was illegal under state law. Had the Colorado Supreme Court
accepted this narrow interpretation, Algoma would not have been
considered dispositive of the referendum issue in Communication
Workers .
3 6
The union's reading of Algoma is not supported, however, by
an examination of the briefs submitted in that case which indi-
cate that the regulation-by-referendum issue was adequately
argued by both sides 7.3 Since the Court was presented with this
31 CoLO. REV. STAT. § 8-3-108(c) (1973). See note 18 supra.
32 WIs. STAT. ch. 57, § 111.06(1)(c) (i939), as amended Wis. STAT. § 111.06(1)(c)1
(Supp. 1.01 1976-77). The Wisconsin all-union referendum requirement was amended in
1975 so that unions certified by elections conducted by the Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Board or the NLRB could negotiate and execute "all-union agreements" without an
authorizing referendum. However, unions that are voluntarily recognized by the employer
must still receive authorization through a referendum before entering into such an agree-
ment.
336 U.S. 301 (1949).
" Brief for Appellant Communication Workers at 27, Reply Brief for Appellant Com-
munication Workers at 11-14, Communication Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 551 P.2d
1065 (Colo. 1976).
=' 336 U.S. at 314-15.
" See Local 34, Int'l Molders, 150 N.L.R.B. 913 (1965); Cyclone Sales, Inc., 115
N.L.R.B. 431 (1956); Safeway Stores, Inc., 81 N.L.R.B. 387 (1949); Northland Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 288 (1948); Giant Food Shopping Center, Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 791
(1948). But see Western Elec. Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 1019 (1949). These Board interpretations
of section 14(b), which are vague and inconsistent, are only persuasive and not binding
on a court. See Chemical & Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.
157, 166 (1971).
31 Respondent Wisconsin Employment Relations Board relied on the legislative his-
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issue, the decision should be read in that light.3" Further, as the
following indirect reference indicates, the Supreme Court did
implicitly sanction the Wisconsin referendum requirement:
It is argued, however, that the effect of this section [14(b)] is to
displace State law which "regulates" but does not wholly "prohibit"
agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
dition of employment. But if there could be any doubt that the
language of the section means that the Act shall not be construed
to authorize any "application" of a union-security contract, such as
discharging an employee, which under the circumstances "is prohib-
ited" by the State, the legislative history of the section would dispel
it. 39
The "circumstances" noted by the Court, under which applica-
tion of a union-security clause was prohibited, stemmed from the
union-security referendum, which then required a two-thirds af-
firmative vote. The union-security agreement in question had not
been authorized by such a referendum and thus was illegal under
Wisconsin law.
The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act also supports
the argument that states may, under 14(b), regulate union-
security agreements by requiring referenda. 0 Both the Wisconsin
and Colorado statutes were in effect and were considered by Con-
gress when it enacted section 14(b). 41 Indeed, it appears that this
tory of section 14(b), Brief for Respondent at 6-14, Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301 (1949), which supports the view that
section 14(b) sanctions not only those state policies which prohibit union-security agree-
ments but also those which are more restrictive than federal law. See H.R. REP. No. 245,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 34, 44 (1947); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 60
(1947); 93 CONG. REc. 7503 (1947) (President Truman's veto message); 93 CONG. REC. 6665-
66 (1947) (analysis of bill by Senator Murray); 93 CONG. REc. 6613, 6678 (1947) (remarks
of Representative Landis). For a judicial interpretation of the legislative history of section
14(b) see Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 98-105 (1963); Algoma
Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301, 314 (1949).
In Algoma the petitioners argued, however, that there should not be a resort to Congres-
sional debate and hearings when the statute is clear on its face. Brief for Petitioner at 8-
16, Reply Brief for Petitioner at 10-12, 14, Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301 (1949).
"[T]hat [this issue] was considered by the [Clourt must be assumed; it was
referred to and discussed in each of the briefs presented." Dostal v. Magee, 273 Wis. 228,
231, 77 N.W.2d 604, 606-07 (1956); accord, Bingham v. United States, 296 U.S. 211, 218-
19 (1935).
3' 336 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added).
See legislative history cited in note 37 supra.
" H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1947); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1947).
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section was inserted to clarify Congress' intent that such statutes
not be preempted by federal law. Therefore, section 14(b) does
not seem to preclude states from requiring union-security refer-
enda.
HI. THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNIT
A. The Colorado "Unit"
The Algoma decision appears to authorize state mandated
union-security clause referenda. One question which was not
raised in Algoma, however, was whether the state could also
"regulate" the appropriate unit in which the referendum was
to be conducted. In Communication Workers, the Colorado
Supreme Court interpreted the referendum requirement under
the CLPA as being closely, if not inextricably, 2 tied to a deter-
mination of the appropriate collective bargaining unit. The
court held that the CLPA mandates, as a prerequisite to the
referendum, a secret ballot election to determine the bargaining
unit.
4 3
The court did not, however, specify exactly what was in-
tended by the term "collective bargaining unit." To add further
confusion, the definition of such a "unit" under the Colorado
statute is ambiguous. 4 Usually, the term "unit" refers to the
group of employees to be represented, not to the representative
agent of that group. The unit might include the employees in an
entire plant; or there may be several units within a single plant,
each unit consisting of employees from separate crafts, divisions,
or departments, and each unit having a different representative
agent. The CLPA seems to confuse the concept of a unit with that
of the representative agent of that unit,4 and the Colorado Su-
l2 "Nor can an essential part of an act, which colors the whole, be stricken as invalid
and the remainder sustained." City & County of Denver v. Lynch, 92 Colo. 102, 108, 18
P.2d 907, 910 (1932).
, See note 51 infra.
" See discussion in note 46 infra.
s CoLo. REv. STAT. § 8-3-104(4) (1973). The determination of the representative
agent, usually a union, has also been preempted from the states:
The federal Board's machinery for dealing with certification problems also
carries implications of exclusiveness. Thus, a State may not certify a union
as the collective bargaining agent for employees where the federal Board, if
called upon, would use its own certification procedure.
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 476 (1955). The Colorado requirement would
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preme Court does not clearly indicate which of these concepts it
is using. 6 Despite its imprecision, however, the court seems to
have been referring, as a practical matter, to the unit as the
also appear to conflict with 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)(i) (1970), which only allows an employer
to enter into a union-security agreement with a labor organization which is determined
as the representative of the employees as provided in 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
" The different interpretations of what a "unit" refers to in the CLPA were presented
to the court. While the Communication Workers maintain that a "unit" is the group of
employees to be represented, the Teamsters Union, in an amicus brief, argued with some
hesitancy that a "unit" in Colorado is the representative union. Brief for Colorado-
Wyoming Joint Council of Teamsters No. 54 as Amicus Curiae at 14, Communication
Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 551 P.2d 1065 (1976).
When the Colorado Supreme Court compares "certification or recognition under the
Federal Act" with the "recognition/definition section" of the CLPA, 551 P.2d at 1077, it
does not refer to La Crosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S.
18 (1949), or Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767
(1947), both of which directly concern the preemption of unit determination. Instead, the
court refers to NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596-97 (1969), which deals
primarily with the validity of NLRB orders instructing employers to bargain with the
union as the exclusive representative of the unit. 551 P.2d at 1077. The question of the
unit as the group of employees to be represented was not at issue in Gissel. A more
appropriate comparison could have been made with Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, Uranium
Div., 162 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966). Thus, while the Colorado Supreme Court did not explicitly
state which interpretation of a collective bargaining unit it accepted, if either, the citation
of Gissel would seem to indicate an implicit acceptance of a Colorado unit as referring to
the representative agent itself. The more likely explanation, however, in view of the
general meaning that usually attaches to the term "unit," is that the court was just
imprecise in its choice of citations.
In examining the different sections of the CLPA it becomes apparent that the statute
does not clearly indicate what constitutes a Colorado unit. Among the various descriptions
are the following: (1) 'Collective bargaining unit' means an organization selected by
secret ballot." CoLO. REv. STAT. § 8-3-104(4) (1973) (emphasis added); (2) "A unit chosen
for the purpose of collective bargaining shall be the exclusive representative of all of the
employees in such unit .... " CoLO. REv. STAT. § 8-3-107(1) (1973) (emphasis added);
(3) A '[riepresentative' includes any person who is the duly authorized agent of a
collective bargaining unit." Cow. REv. STAT. § 8-3-104(17) (1973); (4) A .'[pierson'
includes one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal represent-
atives, trustees, or receivers." CoLO. Rav. STAT. § 8-3-104(16) (1973). These sections of the
CLPA confuse the distinction between the group of employees to be represented, the unit,
and the representative agent, usually the union. Furthermore, a comparison of the parallel
sections of the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act upon which the CLPA was modeled
indicates that the Colorado Legislature did not create these distinctions, as did the Wis-
consin Legislature, and used the term "unit" to refer to both a group of employees and a
representative agent. Compare CoLO. Rav. STAT. §§ 8-3-107(1)-(4) (1973) with Wis. STAT.
§§ 111.05(1)-(4) (1974). Since the court has not clarified this point, the CLPA should be
amended to avoid further confusion. The Colorado Division of Labor, however, had appar-
ently, in administering the CLPA, differentiated these concepts prior to Communication
Workers, despite the statute's ambiguity. Interview with Robert Frey, Labor Mediator for
Colorado Division of Labor, in Denver, Colorado (Sept. 8, 1976) [hereinafter cited as First
Frey Interview].
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group of employees.4" By construing the CLPA to require a secret
ballot election to determine the bargaining unit, if that unit is to
be recognized for the purpose of negotiating a union-security
agreement, the court appears to have raised a serious question as
to whether there is a substantial conflict between state and fed-
eral law on unit determination.
B. Unit Determination and the Preemption Question
The issue of preemption arises because of the possibility that
the procedures followed by the NLRB and the election conducted
by the Colorado Division of Labor could result in the recognition
of different bargaining units.4" The NLRB does not always re-
quire, or even always allow, elections for unit determination;"9 the
Board has discretion to decide when to allow a unit determination
election.o The Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of the
" Since the Division of Labor has traditionally treated a "unit" as the group of
employees to be represented, had the court intended to affect this practice and accept the
Teamsters' suggestion that the CLPA might actually be referring to the representative
union when using the term "unit," a more explicit statement of such would have been
expected. See note 46 supra.
Ax
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a
State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the
federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield. To leave the
States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal
regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by
Congress and requirements imposed by state law.
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959) (emphasis added).
When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as
well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the
National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with na-
tional policy is to be averted.
Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
" See note 13 supra and note 50 infra.
29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970). In Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, Uranium Div., 162
N.L.R.B. 387 (1966), a craft severance unit election was not permitted, since the Board
held that a separate craft unit would not be appropriate. This type of unit election, known
as a "Globe election," Globe Mach. & Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (1937), allows the
employees to decide whether they want a union that represents the larger, more inclusive
unit, or whether they want the smaller, more fragmented units. The Board will allow such
an election only if it feels that either choice would be appropriate for collective bargaining
purposes. In its decision in Mallinckrodt the Board set forth several factors that it would
consider in determining whether a unit was appropriate, and, therefore, whether a unit
election would be permitted:
1. Whether or not the proposed unit consists of a distinct and homogenous
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CLPA would require a secret ballot election in all unit determina-
tion situations as a prerequisite to the unit's negotiation of an
enforceable union-security agreement. The court said:
Inasmuch as no secret ballot election was conducted for the purpose
of establishing a collective bargaining unit authorized to enter into
an all-union agreement with Mountain States and Western Electric,
C.W.A. is not entitled to enforcement of the all-union agreements
provisions which are, in our opinion, invalid. Even if such an elec-
tion had been held and an appropriately authorized collective bar-
gaining unit had been established, the union security provisions here
in issue would be invalid and unenforceable because of the lack of
employee approval through an all-union referendum."
Because of the dissimilarity between the policies underlying
the federal and state procedures, the resulting units could argua-
bly be different. To illustrate, the NLRB must frequently balance
group of skilled journeymen craftsmen performing the functions of their craft
on a nonrepetitive basis, or of employees constituting a functionally distinct
department, working in trades or occupations for which a tradition of sepa-
rate representation exists.
2. The history of collective bargaining of the employees sought and at the
plant involved, and at other plants of the employer, with emphasis on
whether the existing patterns of bargaining are productive of stability in
labor relations, and whether such stability will be unduly disrupted by the
destruction of the existing patterns of representation.
3. The extent to which the employees in the proposed unit have established
and maintained their separate identity during the period of inclusion in the
broader unit, and the extent of their participation or lack of participation in
the establishment and maintenance of the existing pattern of representation
and the prior opportunities, if any, afforded them to obtain separate repre-
sentation.
4. The history and pattern of collective bargaining in the industry involved.
5. The degree of integration of the employer's production processes, includ-
ing the extent to which the continued normal operation of the production
processes is dependent upon the performance of the assigned functions of the
employees in the proposed unit.
6. The qualifications of the union seeking to "carve out" a separate unit,
including that union's experience in representing employees like those in-
volved in the severance action.
162 N.L.R.B. at 397.
11 551 P.2d at 1076 (emphasis added). Prior to this decision, the Colorado Division of
Labor had not required a secret election to determine the appropriate unit unless there
was a dispute as to what the unit should be. The effect of this decision is to require such
an election as a condition precedent to the holding of all union-security referenda. Brief
for Appellant Colorado Division of Labor at 7,'Communication Workers v. Western Elec.
Co., 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1977); First Frey Interview, supra note 46. In the
absence of a dispute as to the appropriateness of the unit, however, it is not entirely clear
what issue such a secret election would be intended to resolve.
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the policy of seeking stable labor-management relations, which is
more often than not advanced by having a small number of larger
units with which the employer must negotiate, against the em-
ployees' freedom to choose a smaller unit, which might represent
a particular craft, department, or division. Generally, the Board
disfavors fragmentation and larger units are thus preferred.2
Under the CLPA, however, there is a strong policy favoring the
smaller unit, as is evidenced by the mandatory craft severance
election held in conjunction with any uhit determination elec-
tion.13 Should Colorado recognize a unit different from that recog-
nized by the NLRB, even if only for the limited and specific
purpose of conducting a union-security referendum, employers
would be compelled to negotiate with the same employees as
members of different bargaining units for different purposes. This
situation creates the very confusion which Board certification
was, in the interest of preventing industrial strife, designed to
avoid.
The United States Supreme Court outlined the reasons for
federal preemption of the unit determination question in
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board:"
Thus, if both [the state and federal] laws are upheld, two adminis-
trative bodies are asserting a discretionary control over the same
subject matter, conducting hearings, supervising elections and de-
termining appropriate units for bargaining in the same plant. They
might come out with the same determination, or they might come
out with different ones as they have in the past .... If the two
boards attempt to exercise a concurrent jurisdiction to decide the
appropriate unit of representation, action by one necessarily denies
the discretion of the other .... The federal board has jurisdiction
of the industry in which these particular employers are engaged and
has asserted control of their labor relations in general. . . . We do
not believe this leaves room for the operation of the state authority
asserted.0
12 Hall, The Appropriate Bargaining Unit: Striking a Balance Between Stable Labor
Relations and Employee Free Choice, 18 CASE W. REs. L. Rav. 479, 531-39 (1967).
13 Dry Cleaners & Laundry Workers Local 304 v. Sunnyside Cleaners & Shirt Laun-
dry, 146 Colo. 31, 37, 360 P.2d 446, 449 (1961). When a craft requests severance from the
larger unit, the NLRB may or may not grant a Globe election. See note 50 supra. However,
under the CLPA the Colorado Division of Labor has no such discretion. Once a craft
severance election is requested, it must be conducted by the Division. CoLo. REv. STAT. §
8-3-107(2) (1973).
330 U.S. 767 (1947).
Id. at 775-76 (emphasis added). The Board has also pointed out the potential
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Against this background, it is difficult to justify the Colorado
Supreme Court's holding that the state and the federal govern-
ment can exercise concurrent power to determine the appropriate
unit for the same group of employees. To answer this query by
saying that Colorado's determination is limited and not general
is to beg the more basic question of whether or not Colorado's
intrusion into this area creates the potential for confusion and
discord which the policy of federal preemption is designed to
avoid.
conflicts which may result from the Colorado unit determination requirement:
It is also possible that the state units would include individuals who are
not included in the Board unit. The state director is empowered to
"determine which persons shall be qualified and entitled to vote at any
election held by him" (C.R.S. 1973 Section 8-3-107(5)). Contrary to Section
9(b)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 159(b)(3), the Labor Peace Act does not
preclude the inclusion of plant guards in the same unit with other employees.
And, while the Labor Peace Act appears to exclude supervisors from the
definition of "employee" (C.R.S. 1973 Section 8-3-104(11)(a)), it does not
contain a definition of "supervisors" comparable to that in Section 2(11) of
the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 152(11).
Brief for NLRB as Amicus Curiae at 7-8 n.6, Communication Workers v. Western Elec.
Co., 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1977).
If the Colorado unit included individuals not in the Board unit, it is
possible that a union security provision could be rejected as the result of the
vote of individuals whom the union, insofar as the NLRA was concerned, did
not represent. On the other hand, should a union security provision be ap-
proved in such unit, the union would be compelled, insofar as state law was
concerned, to represent those individuals in negotiations over union security.
Cf. C.R.S. 1973 Section 8-3-108(c) . ...
Id. at 9 n.9.
The first proviso to Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3), per-
mits the discharge of an employee for failure to pay union dues as re-
quired by a union security agreement only "if [the union] is the representa-
tive of the employees as provided in Section 9(a), in the appropriate
collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made ***." Ac-
cordingly, an employer would violate Section 8(a)(3), and a union Section
8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(2), of the NLRA by enforcing a union security
agreement covering a bargaining unit other than that approved by the Board
under Section 9 of the Act. Such violation is particularly likely to occur when
the agreement covers a unit that is clearly inappropriate under the NLRA
because it contains individuals, such as supervisors, who are statutorily ex-
cluded from Section 9 units. . . . On the other hand, should an employer
or union attempt to apply a union security arrangement covering the Board-
approved unit, rather than the state-approved union security unit, they
would, under the decision below, violate the Labor Peace Act (see C.R.S.
1973 Section 8-3-108(1)(c), (2)(b)).
Id. at 10-11 (footnote omitted).
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The Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of the CLPA
was not the court's only alternative. In its conflict of provisions
section, the CLPA provides:
Wherever the application of the provisions of other statutes or
laws conflict with the application of the provisions of this article,
this article shall prevail; except that, in any situation where the
provisions of this article cannot be validly enforced, the provisions
of such other statutes or laws shall apply."
If the court had held the question of unit determination was
preempted by federal law, this section would have substituted the
federal method of unit determination for that provided in the
CLPA. 57 Most of the conflict between the state and federal stat-
utes concerning the determination of the appropriate bargaining
unit would have been avoided. The unit determined by the NLRB
would still have been required to comply with the CLPA's refer-
endum before it could negotiate a union-security agreement,
which, in any event, is the more important consideration from
Colorado's point of view. The court did not, however, choose this
interpretation, and its reading of the statute" is a final interpre-
tation of state law. 9
SCoLO. R v. STAT. § 8-3-120 (1973).
,It is clear that the determination of the collective bargaining [unit]
within which the referendum is to be conducted is made by the Division of
Labor. If ... election for a collective bargaining unit is preempted and,
therefore, falls under the jurisdiction of federal law, the argument is easily
answered in those instances where an appropriate bargaining unit has been
determined either through certification or voluntary recognition under the
provision of the National Labor Relations Act. The director must conduct
the referendum within the unit established.
Answer Brief for Appellee Mountain States at 15, Communication Workers v. Western
Elec. Co., 551 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1976). There still may be problems, however, with attempt-
ing to conduct a referendum in an NLRB-recognized unit, when that unit cuts across state
boundaries:
[Tihe bargaining unit established in accordance with federal law may be
inconsistent with that required by state regulation. Though the unit for the
Michigan strike vote cannot extend beyond the State's borders, the unit for
which appellant union is the federally certified bargaining representative
includes Chrysler plants in California and Indiana as well as Michigan....
Without question, the Michigan provision conflicts with the exercise of feder-
ally protected labor rights. A state statute so at war with federal law cannot
survive.
UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 458-59 (1950). But see Western Elec. Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 1019
(1949).
' CoLO. REv. STAT. § 8-3-104(4) (1973).
11 O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 531 (1974).
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C. The Scope of Section 14(b)
The Colorado Supreme Court was aware of the preemption
issues raised by its holding that the state could make a unit
determination decision which might not be in accord with that
reached by the NLRB. However, in an end run of this question,
the court held that the state's authority to determine units in
which union-security referenda could be conducted is "merely an
incident of the state's power to prohibit the application of union-
security agreements under the permissive grant of authority con-
tained in § 14(b)."10 The court offers no authority or justification
for this conclusion other than its own interpretation of state pow-
ers under section 14(b).
The most explicit statement by the United States Supreme
Court on the scope of state powers under section 14(b) came in
Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn.51 In upholding the jurisdiction of
a state to enforce its "right-to-work" law," the Court noted that
the authority is narrow. For example, picketing to obtain a union-
security agreement is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NLRB even in states which prohibit the execution or application
of such agreements.6 3 The Court further stated that a state's regu-
latory authority "begins only with the actual negotiation and
execution of the type of agreement described by § 14(b). Absent
such an agreement, conduct arguably an unfair labor practice
would be a matter for the National Labor Relations Board under
Garmon."4 While Schermerhorn II does not directly address the
state's authority to determine the appropriateness of a bargaining
unit for union-security clause purposes, it does indicate that sec-
" 551 P.2d at 1079.
61 375 U.S. 96 (1963) [hereinafter referred to as Schermerhorn II]; cf. Oil, Chem. &
Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Mobil Oil Corp., 96 S. Ct. 2140, 2146 (1976).
12 Grodin & Beeson, State Right-to-Work Laws and Federal Labor Policy, 52 CALIF.
L. REv. 95, 106-13 (1964). The term "right-to-work" is often used to refer to those states
which absolutely prohibit union-security agreements. A "modified right-to-work" state
refers to a state, such as Colorado, that prohibits union-security agreements, but only
when the required majority approval is not satisfied pursuant to a referendum.
11 375 U.S. at 105; accord, Local 438, Constr. & Gen. Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371
U.S. 542, 547-48 (1963). For a discussion of the problems created by the preemption of
state jurisdiction under section 14(b) with respect to picketing see Comment, Labor Lau:
Extent of State Power to Enforce Right-to-Work Laws, 49 MINN. L. REv. 307 (1964);
Comment, Supreme Court Precludes Relief From Section 14(b) Picketing, 17 STAN. L.
REv. 158 (1964).
" 375 U.S. at 105 (emphasis in original).
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tion 14(b) is a narrow cession of authority back to the states.
Under the principle announced in Schermerhorn II, since negotia-
tion of a union-security clause in Colorado cannot even properly
begin prior to the determination of the appropriate unit or its
agent, 5 Colorado's attempt to regulate unit determination would
seem to fall outside the scope of jurisdiction granted to the state
under section 14(b).
A final twist to the potential state-federal conflict presented
by the Colorado Supreme Court's decision should be noted. There
may be situations when an NLRB-conducted election would sat-
isfy the CLPA's requirement that the appropriate unit be deter-
mined by a secret ballot. The CLPA defines elections as those
conducted by the Colorado Division of Labor and "any other
tribunal having competent jurisdiction."6 Assuming that the
NLRB has "competent jurisdiction" within the meaning of the
CLPA, units which had been determined in an NLRB election
could proceed to the union-security referendum. As noted earlier,
however, the NLRB does not always conduct such elections. 7
Those units determined without an election could not proceed to
the union-security referendum. Consequently, depending on the
NLRB's method of unit determination, some, but not all, NLRB-
determined units would be eligible to conduct the union-security
authorization election.
The Algoma decision indicated that states may, pursuant to
section 14(b), set up union-security referenda. However, it ap-
pears that the Colorado Supreme Court may have gone too far in
adding an additional requirement that to be eligible to conduct
the union-security referenda the appropriate bargaining unit
must be determined in a CLPA-authorized election. The Colo-
rado Supreme Court treated the unit determination election and
the union-security referendum in the CLPA as an inseparable
procedure. Two constitutional challenges to this process may be
advanced: equal protection and preemption. It is arguably a de-
nial of equal protection to allow those units determined by an
election conducted by the NLRB to proceed with a union-security
U CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-3-108(1)(d) (1973). See ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961);
Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945).
u CoLo. REv. STAT. § 8-3-104(10) (1973).
," See notes 13 and 50 supra.
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referendum, while denying the same right to units determined by
the Board without an election.
6 8
Preemption appears, however, to be a stronger argument. By
its adoption of section 14(b), Congress clarified the authority of
the states to be more restrictive in their regulation of union-
security agreements than amended section 8(a)(3) of the same
act. Under the Wagner Act, a union-security agreement could be
negotiated by any recognized collective bargaining unit. 9 Section
8(a)(3)(ii) of the Taft-Hartley amendments allowed such agree-
ments only after they had been authorized by a simple majority
of all employees eligible to vote in a unit determination election. 0
Although the mandatory federal authorization election was aban-
doned in a 1951 amendment to the act,7 the 1947 amendments
indicate a congressional desire to permit states to be more restric-
" Since this is an economic issue, the traditional equal protection "rational basis"
test would most likely have been applied, considerably reducing the possibility of a suc-
cessful challenge. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 96 S. Ct. 2513 (1976); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). The application of this test almost insures that an act will
be upheld. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976); San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Recognizing that this unforseen
and convoluted application of Colorado law could not have been intended by the state
legislature, the Court, on the other hand, might have applied a "rational basis plus" test
in examining the statute, a more stringent test than the traditional "rational basis" test.
See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAv. L. Rev. 1, 8-20
(1970). The Burger Court, however, has not used this test in examining economic legisla-
tion. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 96 S. Ct. 2513 (1976). See Canby, The Burger Court
and the Validity of Classifications in Social Legislation: Currents of Federalism, 1975
Aiuz. ST. L.J. 1, 7-18; Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HAsT. CONST. L.Q.
645 (1975); cf. Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and
the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975).
" Wagner Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1940) (amended 1947).
T' Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, § 8(a)(3)(ii), 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(amending 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1940)). Before this section was amended it brought
about an unusual result in several instances:
In an election for the approval of a union-shop agreement, a majority of all
eligible employees may vote in favor of such agreement, but this may be less
than three-fourths of the employees actually voting, in which case the con-
tract would be legal under Taft-Hartley, but illegal under the Colorado Act.
In another case, three-fourths of the employees actually voting might vote
affirmatively, but might not constitute a majority of all employees eligible
to vote, in which case the contract would be legal under Colorado law but
not under Taft-Hartley.
Hornbein, The Extent to Which Taft-Hartley Has Superseded State Labor Laws, 28 DICTA
47, 50 (1951) (footnote omitted).
1, National Labor Relations Act Amendments, ch. 534, § b, 65 Stat. 601 (1951).
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tive of union-security agreements than the federal policy, if they
so choose. Among the more restrictive state policies in force at the
time section 14(b) was debated and of which Congress was aware
were those statutes, such as the Colorado and Wisconsin acts,
that required something more than the simple majority of the
federal referendum provision governing union-security clauses.
The more restrictive state policies permitted by section 14(b)
might then be interpreted as being limited to the authorizing
referendum. While Congress clearly intended to allow states to
regulate union-security agreements in this fashion under section
14(b), nowhere in the legislative history does it appear that
Congress wished to permit states to regulate unit determinations
for union-security purposes.7 3 Thus, section 14(b) should not be
used to uphold this exception to the Bethlehem Steel holding that
unit determinations are preempted from state authority.
In light of the Colorado Supreme Court's lack of authority for
this exception, the United States Supreme Court's summary dis-
missal on appeal does little to clarify the extent of state powers
under section 14(b). By holding that no substantial federal ques-
tion was involved in Communication Workers-a somewhat sur-
prising determination in light of the serious constitutional issues
raised by the case-the Supreme Court leaves us to speculate on
how the conflicts arguably resulting from the enforcement of the
CLPA are to be reconciled with the preemption doctrine."
IV. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF Communication Workers
Colorado, by basing the referendum on the unit election re-
quirement, may force unions to put pressure on the NLRB, as a
tribunal of competent jurisdiction, to conduct unit determination
11 H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1947); 93 CONG. REc. 6665-66 (1947)
(analysis of the bill by Senator Murray).
13 While Congress was aware of the recent Bethlehem Steel decision, 330 U.S. 767
(1947), preempting unit determination, it made no attempt when considering section
14(b) to include within the section a statutory exception for unit determination for union-
security purposes. SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947).
" A number of attorneys familiar with Communication Workers feel that one explan-
ation for this dismissal was that the Supreme Court accepted the appellee's contention
that, since fragmentation or conflict of bargaining units had not yet actually occurred, the
issue was not sufficiently ripe for review. Brief for Appellee Western Elec. Co. at 14-20,
Communication Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 45 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1977).
Another plausible explanation is the Court's reluctance to deal with this issue, in light of
President Carter's support for the repeal of section 14(b).
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elections so that those Colorado units can then proceed to the
union-security election. This could inhibit the Board's discretion
in the performance of its duties.75
An additional problem is that the Colorado Division of
Labor, which has the primary responsibility under the CLPA for
conducting unit elections and referenda, does not have the capa-
bility to supervise the potential overload of elections which en-
forcement of Communication Workers might impose on it." In
1975 the Division conducted only seven or eight unit determina-
tion elections, and only 27 union-scurity referenda.77 Since 1943
there have been only 375 union shop referenda.78 There are ap-
proximately 4,750 to 5,700 collective bargaining units in Colo-
rado,79 95% of which have already been recognized or certified by
the NLRB.' Many, if not most, of these units have not been
determined by a CLPA unit election.8 Thus, a unit election
would be required before a referendum could be held. And with
the possibility of unit fragmentation as a result of the CLPA unit
severance provisions, an even greater number of referenda might
be necessary.
Since the Division is not currently capable of meeting such
a dramatic increase in the demand for unit determination and
union-security elections, the practical effect of this decision may
be to frustrate employees and unions in their attempts to seek
11 "As the political winds change and new members are appointed [to the Board]
the unit decisions may show drastic turnabouts." J. ABODEELY, THE NLRB AND THE APPRO-
PRIATE BARGAINING UNrr 13 (1971). By exercising its discretion as to whether or not to hold
a unit election, the Board can, either directly or indirectly, affect which unit shall prevail.
This, in turn, may determine the issue of union representation. Id. at 225, citing Liberty
Coach Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 182 (1970), where the bargaining unit found appropriate by the
Board was determinative of the representative question. The Board's decision on unit
appropriateness, and thus on unit elections, will determine whether a union representing
that unit can ever obtain a legal union-security agreement.
76 The Division of Labor has estimated that it might need between 20 and 50 more
employees and between one and three million more dollars to conduct these elections.
Carey, Union 'security agreements' in jeopardy, Rocky Mountain News (Denver), Feb. 7,
1977, at 6, col. 1.
" Second Frey Interview, supra note 17.
.' Motion for stay of mandate by the defendant State of Colorado with attached
affidavit at 1, 3-4, Communication Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 551 P.2d 1065 (Colo.
1976) [hereinafter cited as Motion for stay].
7 Second Frey Interview, supra note 17.
Motion for stay, supra note 78.
" Second Frey Interview, supra note 17.
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unit and union-security elections. These elections have usually
been conducted by the Colorado Division of Labor within two
weeks of the request. 2 A significant increase in the number of
requests for these elections may create long delays during which
time an employer might seek to discourage employees from voting
for a union-security agreements or to persuade employees to vote
against the formation of a CLPA bargaining unit; or, in hopes of
dividing union solidarity, the employer might seek to encourage
craft fragmentation of the bargaining unit. The problems created
by having a single NLRB unit for general collective bargaining
purposes that encompasses several CLPA units for the specific
purpose of the authorization referendum can only lead to confu-
sion for employers, employees, and unions.
During the potential delays before elections, union funds de-
rived from initiation fees and dues could drop significantly, since
union-security provisions requiring such payments would notyet
have been validated. Even though the union, which has been
recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent by the NLRB, might
be crippled financially, it will still be required under federal law
to fairly represent all the employees in grievance, arbitration, and
collective bargaining matters, regardless of whether the employ-
ees have tendered dues to that union. 4 Employees who are paying
'2 First Frey Interview, supra note 46.
u Even if the director of the Division of Labor should find that the employer has
committed an unfair labor practice by interfering with the employees' free choice in the
referendum, there is some question as to whether an adequate remedy is available. If the
referendum is still required to authorize a union-security clause, there appears to be little
discouragement of employers from interfering with this right. CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 8-3-
108(4) and 8-3-110(7) (1973).
, In Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944), the Court stated:
The duties of a bargaining agent selected under the terms of the Act
extend beyond the mere representation of the interests of its own group
members. By its selection as bargaining representative, it has become the
agent of all the employees, charged with the responsibility of representing
their interests fairly and impartially.
Id. at 255. See also Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 COLun. L. Rv.
556, 565-67 (1945). For a critique of this principle see Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive
Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be
Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. Rav. 897 (1975). It is this principle of exclusivity, with its
concomitant requirement of fair representation of all employees in the unit, to which many
point when supporting the concept of union security:
Copgress recognized that in the absence of a union-security provision "many
employees sharing the benefits of what unions are able to accomplish by
collective bargaining will refuse to pay their share of the cost."
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for the union's services might be expected to put pressure on their
fellow employees who are not. This pressure would probably be
most pronounced in the many small units that predominate on
the Colorado labor scene, since most employees would know each
other, and therefore would know who was not contributing his or
her fair share.
Unions, to insure their success in these elections which now
become so vital to their financial strength, can be expected to
expand their campaign activity among the employees. Rather
than attempting to foster greater cooperation between labor and
management, union activists may emphasize their conflicts with
management in these campaigns in order to gain greater support
from other employees.5 It takes little imagination to see both that
S. RE. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947).
Section 8(a)(3) gives employers and employees who feel that union-security
agreements promote stability by eliminating "free riders" the right to con-
tinue such arrangements.
Id. at 7.
For a comparison of the exclusive representation question in foreign countries see Bok,
Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84 HAav. L. REV. 1394,
1425-30 (1970); Summers, American and European Labor Law: The Use and Usefulness
of Foreign Experience, 16 Burr. L. REv. 210 (1966).
In criticizing the original Taft-Hartley majority referendum requirement to author-
ize union-security clauses, Archibald Cox pointed out the negative factors resulting from
a referendum election requirement:
One disadvantage is the delay which will result in the negotiation of collec-
tive bargaining agreements. The election will have to be held before negotia-
tions for the contract can be commenced and, even if the Board is able to
expedite its processes, the election proceedings are likely to take a considera-
ble period of time. A second disadvantage is the election campaign which will
inevitably precede each ballot. Union leaders will be under heavy pressure
to arouse the employees' enthusiasm for strengthening their organization
against the employer; and any competing union in the plant, if not the
employer himself, will be tempted to campaign against the union. Such a
period builds up intense emotions; friction develops and production is
slowed. Nor is it easy to resume normal relationships. In newly organized
plants the problem will be especially difficult for, instead of the period of
readjustment which should follow the selection of a collective bargaining
representative, there will come renewed conflict over the union shop.
Moreover, the execution of the initial union shop contract may not al-
ways mark the end of the struggle. Section 9(e)(2), by providing for votes as
often as once a year upon petition of 30% of the employees, holds out the
constant hope that the union's authority may be subsequently curtailed.
Thus, each annual bargaining conference will be conducted under the threat
of being suddenly interrupted by the filing of a petition and the subsequent
turmoil of an election campaign.
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this situation could produce the very industrial confusion and
strife which the National Labor Relations Act was designed to
minimize and that the United States Supreme Court should have
more closely considered these issues.
CONCLUSION
Algoma supports Colorado's regulation of union-security
clauses by the referendum vehicle. Bethlehem Steel holds that
Colorado's power to determine appropriate units for general pur-
poses of collective bargaining has been preempted by federal leg-
islation. Determination of the representative agent is also within
the sole responsibility of the NLRB. Schermerhorn II and the
legislative history of section 14(b)86 indicate that the scope of
authority granted to the states by this section should be narrowly
construed and should not be extended to encompass unit deter-
mination for the specific purpose of conducting union-security
referenda. The United States Supreme Court's handling of the
case, in effect affirming Communication Workers, requires specu-
lation as to why the Court found no substantial federal question.
If, and when, actual conflict does occur between federal and state
policy on unit determination, a closer scrutiny by the Court of
these issues seems justified.
The Colorado Supreme Court, by interpreting the CLPA as
mandating a unit election as a necessary prerequisite to a union-
security referendum, may have so entangled these two require-
ments that the entire unit and referendum procedure might have
fallen had the United States Supreme Court struck down the unit
election provision. 7 Had this occurred, employers and employees
could have freely negotiated union-security agreements absent an
authorizing referendum under section 8(a)(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act.88 The Colorado Legislature, however, could
have reinstituted the authorization referendum requirement by
simply amending the CLPA, so that such a referendum could be
Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HAv. L. REv. 274,
298 (1948) (footnotes omitted).
" See note 37 supra.
" Another alternative is that had the United States Supreme Court struck down the
CLPA unit election requirement a remand to the state court of Communication Workers
could have been ordered for a determination of the severability of the unit and referendum
requirements.
" 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
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conducted in that portion of any NLRB-recognized unit con-
tained within Colorado, whether determined by an election or
otherwise.
In light of the low number of state referenda conducted in the
past, and the high rate of approval for union-shop agreements in
these elections, elimination of the referendum is the most logical,
economical, and administratively manageable alternative."
Employee input into the union-security issue would be preserved.
The employees can seek to influence the type, if any, of union-
security clauses negotiated through their normal union channels.
More importantly, employees can force the federal Board, by
petition of 30% of the employees,9 0 to conduct a deauthorizing
referendum which would rescind a union-security clause." While
the authorizing referendum conducted by Colorado, which
" From 1945 to 1960 the Industrial Commission (which supervised Colorado labor
election procedures before this responsibility was transferred to the Division of Labor)
conducted only 347 all-union referenda, of which the union won 314. H. SELIGSON & G.
BARDWELL, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN COLORADO 147 (1969). This high rate of
approval involves union-shop agreements-the most stringent form of union-security
clause now permitted. Even higher rates of approval might be expected in referenda
conducted for lesser or modified union-security agreements, such as a maintenance-of-
membership clause. Seligson and Bardwell also point out that the Industrial Commission
"conduct[ed] all-union elections in collective bargaining units which have been certified
in representative elections conducted by the National Labor Relations Board." Id. at 146.
The Division of Labor has followed this procedure. Second Frey Interview, supra note 17.
Wisconsin, which also has a referendum requirement, has had similar experiences.
The unions there have won all-union referenda about 87% of the time. G. HAFERBECKER,
WISCONSIN LABOR LAWS 168 (1958). This probably understates the number of union-
security clauses agreed to in Wisconsin, since "[iut is obvious that a large number of all-
union agreements have been executed in defiance of the statutory provisions." Id. at 168,
quoting 11941-1942] WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BD. ANN. REP. 8. This defiance
is interesting in light of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board's opinion in Mathie-
Ruder Brewing Co., Dec. No. 1506 (1948), cited in Comment, A Study of the Wisconsin
Employment Peace Act-Part Il-Union Security, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 481, 487-88. This
comment points out that "the mere inclusion in a collective bargaining agreement of an
unauthorized 'all-union' clause is a violation of the Act."
Since over 90% of the unions in Colorado have negotiated some form of union-security
clauses, and few referenda have been held, First Frey Interview, supra note 46, it appears
that Colorado employers, as well as Wisconsin employers, have been willing to agree to
all-union contracts without referenda. The federal referendum requirement was dropped
in 1951 because of the high cost of holding these elections, as well as the high rate of union-
security clause approvals. H.R. REP. No. 1082, 82d Cong., lst Sess. (1951); 1949 NLRB
ANN. REP. 6.
" 29 U.S.C. § 159(e) (1970).
" 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)(ii) (1970). A majority of the employees eligible to vote is
required to rescind the union-security clause.
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usually results in approval of the union-security clause anyway,
would not then be mandated by the state, the deauthorizing ref-
erendum conducted by the NLRB would still be available upon
petition to provide similar protection of employee rights. The
additional and unnecessary time and expense to the State of
Colorado would be avoided, along with all the potential confusion
accompanying these elections.
Legislative elimination of Colorado's union-security authori-
zation referendum, 2 either by the state93 or by congressional re-
peal of section 14(b), would merely legitimize the traditional
practice in Colorado of negotiating and executing such agree-
ments absent a referendum," and thereby reinstate the status
quo prior to Communication Workers.
August Randall Vehar
12 For a discussion of the policy considerations and controversy surrounding union-
security agreements see Dempsey, The Right-to-Work Controversy, 16 LAB. L.J. 387
(1965); McDermott, Union Security and Right-to-Work Law, 16 LAB. L.J. 667 (1965);
Niebank, In Defense of Right-to-Work Laws, 8 LAB. L.J. 459 (1957); Toner, There's No
Defense of Right-to-Work Laws, 9 LAB. L.J. 566 (1958); Warshal, "Right-to-Work," Pro
and Con, 17 LAB. L.J. 131 (1966).
For a survey of right-to-work laws in other states see Morgan, Right-to-Work Laws:
The Current State of Affairs, 23 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 570 (1972). For problems created
by these laws see Eissinger, The Right-to-Work Imbroglio, 51 N. DAK. L. REv. 571 (1975).
" In the one instance where the people of Colorado were able to render a direct
opinion on this issue, they overwhelmingly rejected a proposal to make Colorado a "right-
to-work" state and prohibit all union-security agreements by a vote of 318,480 to 200,319.
Proposed Constitutional Amendment No. 5, An Act to Amend Article II of the State
Constitution Providing that Membership in Any Labor Union or Organization Shall Not
Be Required as a Condition to Obtain or Retain Employment, Nov. 4, 1958. On file with
the Colorado Legislative Council, Colorado State Capitol, Denver, Colorado.
" See note 89 supra.
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